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CHAPTER 4 
Contracts and Agency 
ROBERT W. BODFISH and WENDELL F. GRIMES 
A. CONTRACTS 
§4.1. Conditions precedent: Parol evidence. An interesting applica-
tion of the well-settled doctrine that a condition precedent to the 
taking effect of a contract may be shown by parol was seen in Tilo 
Roofing Co. v. Pellerin.1 The defendant testified that an order for re-
siding of his house which he signed was upon a prior oral statement of 
the plaintiff's salesman "to look over a job which his company had per-
formed on an adjoining street and if they did not like it, the defend-
ants could notify the plaintiff company to that effect and their signa-
tures would mean nothing and the order would be called off." 
Within a reasonable time the defendant notified the plaintiff in writ-
ing of his cancellation of the order.2 
Action was commenced for breach of contract. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court affirmed a verdict for the defendant, allowing the above 
testimony to show a condition precedent to the contract's becoming ef-
fective. The Court cited Section 241 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts as authority for the allowance of parol evidence in the case. 
That section provides that where the parties agree beforehand or con-
temporaneously with the making of the written contract that it shall 
not become effective until the happening of a future event, the oral 
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§4.1. 1331 Mass. 743, 122 N.E.2d 460 (1954). 
2331 Mass. at 744, 122 N .E.2d at 461. One of the plaintiff's contentions concerned 
the sufficiency of this notice to cancel the order. Defendant did not say that he did 
not like the plaintiff's work but simply that he could not see fit to pay for it. The 
Court, however, held the notice sufficient. 
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condition is operative unless there is something in the written contract 
inconsistent with it. 
The testimony of the defendant quoted above might have been con-
strued otherwise. It allows the defendant, after he has signed the or-
der, to look at another job done by the plaintiff and, if he is not 
satisfied, he can notify the plaintiff and "the order will be called off." 
However, the fact that all of this took place during the negotiations 
and before any work on the defendant's house could be done, and with 
the defendant doing nothing but signing a printed "order blank," 
aided the Court in its decision. The Court also, it should be noted, as-
serted, "Persuasive evidence that the contract was not to be effective 
immediately was afforded by the testimony relating to the proposed in-
vestigation of the defendant's credit rating." 3 
§4.2. Silence as acceptance: Uncontradicted invoices. A defendant 
may be held liable for work done where circumstances warrant the 
plaintiff's assumption that defendant is liable and invoices to defend-
ant are not contradicted. In Wiley & Foss) Inc. v. Saxony Theatres) 
Inc. 1 one Sisson engaged the plaintiff to remodel the Saxony Theatre 
owned by defendant corporation. Thereafter Sisson requested work 
to be done on another theatre, the Gem. The latter was not owned by 
the defendant, but the plaintiff thought it was. Invoices of the latter 
work were sent the defendant and not contradicted until some time 
after the work was completed. It seems that Sisson was president of 
Saxony Theatres, Inc., and also of a corporation owning the Gem 
Theatre, both being in Fitchburg. The addresses of both corporations 
were the same and the plaintiff's invoices were, of course, sent to this 
address. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial court decision and 
held the evidence of the invoices was enough to show "some liability" 
and therefore enough to take the case to the jury. The decision seems 
an eminently fair one. The outward appearances and the position of 
Sisson were enough to give the plaintiff reasonable grounds to believe 
that Sisson was representing both theaters. The thin corporate veil in 
this case was not enough to prevent recovery where the invoices were 
received and not contradicted for so long a time by the defendant cor-
poration. 
§4.3. Illegal contracts: Failure to procure installation permit. 
There has been a growing interest in the subject of restitution in re-
cent years.1 It has caused some re-examination of the older rules in 
3331 Mass. at 746, 122 N.E.2d at 462. 
§4.2. 1332 Mass. 172, 124 N.E.2d 903 (1955). 
§4.3. 1 See Edwin W. Patterson's contribution to A Symposium - The New York 
State Law Revision Commission, entitled Improvements in the Law of Restitution, 
40 Cornell L.Q. 667 (1955). The Bar has received strong hints as to the usefulness 
of the concept of unjust enrichment in two cases decided during the 1955 SURVEY 
year: Flower v. Surburban Land Co., 332 Mass. 30, 123 N.E.2d 218 (1954) (law ac-
tion); Barry v. Covich, 332 Mass. 338, 124 N.E.2d 921 (1955) (equitable action). 
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regard to remedies in the event of illegality in contracts.2 A signifi-
cant Massachusetts decision during the 1955 SURvEYlyear deserves ex-
amination in this regard. 
In Hawes Electric Co. v. Angell 3 the Supreme Judicial Court had be-
fore it a case involving the failure to procure a fire department permit 
for the install.ation of an oil burner. On the matter of the contract it-
self, the Court asserted, "There was evidence tending to show that the 
price of the burner was $1,150 and the cost of installation $131.50. 
But there was evidence tending to show that the price of the burner 
and its installation were included in an entire price of $1,281.50." 4 
Finding that the plaintiff clearly had failed to obtain an installation 
permit, the Court held he could not recover the cost of services for in-
stallation. Here the Court cited as the only prior authority on the 
point Tocci v. Lembo.5 In the latter case, the plaintiff was denied re-
covery for construction of a house immediately after World War II be-
cause of a failure to get authorization for construction from the housing 
authority. The public policy giving veterans preference was involved 
rather than a safety regulation. 
In the instant case, however, the Court allowed the plaintiff to re-
cover for the cost of the oil burner itself, holding that contract could 
be found to have been separable to this extent. The Court also re-
versed the trial court's action in leaving to the jury the question of 
seriousness of the illegality in the contract, holding that this was a 
question of law. 
The language quoted from the opinion above will indicate that the 
evidence was not strong to indicate separability in this contract. To 
that extent the decision of the Court may be considered as a mitiga-
tion of the stronger rules in regard to illegality. In Tocci v. Lembo6 
the Court distinguished an earlier Holmes decision, Fox v. Roger,7 
where a contractor who had failed to procure a local permit for the 
plumbing work involved, and who installed a different type of pipe 
than that required by statute, was allowed to recover. Justice Holmes 
said, "There is no policy of the law against the plaintiff's recovery, un-
less his contract was illegal and a contract is not necessarily illegal be-
cause it is carried out in an illegal way." 8 The Fox decision has been 
criticized by Williston9 and perhaps the instant Hawes Electric is fur-
ther indication of the present Court's reluctance to follow it. 
2 Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions - Reasons 
For and Against Recovery, 25 Texas L. Rev. 31 (1946); Wade, Restitution of Benefits 
Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 261 (1947); Bartron v. 
Coddington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2 N.W.2d 337 (1942). 
3332 Mass. 190, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 45, 124 N.E.2d 257. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 46, 124 N.E.2d at 259. 
5325 Mass. 707, 92 N.E.2d 254 (1950). 
6 Ibid. 
7171 Mass. 546, 50 N.E. 1041 (1898). 
8171 Mass. at 547, 50 N.E. at 1042 . 
. 96 Williston, Contracts §1761 (rev. ed. 1938). 
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§4.4. Modification of contracts. It is very dangerous to strike pro-
visions from contracts without the most careful review of the effect of 
the provisions remaining. In A-J Beverage Co. v. American Dry Gin-
ger Ale CO.l a contract was canceled except for an agreement of in-
debtedness in a specific sum, and a single paragraph under which the 
plaintiff assumed "full responsibility" for the manufacture, bottling, 
sale and distribution of beverages involved, and in no event would 
the defendant "be held responsible for improper preparation, bottling 
or manufacture" of the beverages,2 and that the defendant not be liable 
for claims growing out of acts of the plaintiff. In a suit for money 
due, the defendant sought to recoup for loss to its good will through 
negligent and improper preparation, manufacture, and bottling by 
the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the paragraph in the origi-
nal agreement in regard to the duties owed to the defendant in respect 
to the manufacture and bottling of the beverage was stricken out. The 
remaining paragraph relates to a different subject, namely, the obliga-
tion on the part of the plaintiff to indemnify and save harmless the de-
fendant from claims of third parties resulting from acts of the plaintiff 
in manufacture and distribution. The Court held that damage to 
good will was not recoverable under this paragraph. 
§4.5. Interpretation of contracts: Business custom. A somewhat 
broad interpretation of the "business custom" rule for imposing re-
strictions on contract rights was applied by the Court in Northeast 
Wholesale Flower Corp. v. Boston Flower Exchange, Inc.l The de-
fendant operates the Boston flower exchange and rents space to flower 
growers and "in certain instances to commission salesmen." 2 The de-
fendant rented space to one Given who in turn made an arrangement 
with the plaintiff, a commission salesman, to sell at this space flowers 
grown by Given. It seems that Given asked permission from the de-
fendant to allow the plaintiff to act in this way for him and was re-
fused. The plaintiff brought an action against defendant to compel 
him to give such permission. 
The lower court found the material facts and reported the case to 
the Supreme Judicial Court. The lower court found that it was "the 
long established and universal custom" for lessees to ask permission of 
the defendant before allowing commission agents to act for them on 
the floor. The Court affirmed this finding as not plainly wrong. Since 
nothing in the lease was in conflict with this custom, the Court found 
it a part of the agreement. Justice Ronan asserted: 
The orderly operation by the defendant of the exchange requires 
supervision by the defendant over the conduct of those who use its 
§4.4. 1 332 Mass. 88, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 959, 123 N.E.2d 599. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 960, 123 N.E.2d at 600. 
§4.5. 1332 Mass. 388, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 277, 125 N.E.2d 237. 
2 Ibid. 
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facilities. Their character, integrity, financial ability must be 
such that the reputation of the exchange will not be injured. Out-
side or competitive interests of proposed commission merchants 
must not be permitted if in the judgment of the directors it would 
be better for the defendant tl;1at they should not be allowed to do 
business on the floor of the exchange.3 
The Court did not discuss any need for actual knowledge of the cus-
tom on the part of Given or the plaintiff. This would seem to be on 
the well-settled doctrine that a universal business custom is binding on 
those engaged in the business regardless of actual knowledge.4 Here, 
the custom was not a part of the "business" of growing and selling 
flowers, but was so essentially tied up with these as to come within the 
rule, since it concerned the flower exchange itself. The case is an in-
teresting one in regard to the application of custom to "annex terms to 
a contract," to use Williston's phrase,5 in a situation where the custom 
actually restricts one of the parties in exercising a right inherent in the 
contract, but concerning which the contract was silent. 
However, it would seem that the essential point in the case was 
treated rather lightly. Even assuming the custom of getting permis-
sion is operative (and, after all, the lessee Given did ask permission), 
what is the breadth of discretion in the exchange to grant or refuse 
permission? The language quoted from the opinion seems more di-
rected at initial leasing to commission salesmen as such, rather than to 
a grower's hiring of the salesmen merely to sell his flowers for him. 
The character of the grower and his financial status must stand behind 
the salesman in this case. The salesman is not then "competing" with 
the market, either. There is no indication in the opinion of the 
grounds for refusing permission in this case. 
B. AGENCY 
§4.6. Apparent authority. A significant decision applied the rules 
of apparent authority in an agent to bind the principal, a municipal 
government agency, even though the agency was bound by another 
controlling state agency not to make such a contract without its ap-
proval. In Chessman v. Somerville Housing Authority! the plaintiff 
was employed by the defendant agency as executive director under a 
five-year contract. The defendant was empowered by statute to em-
ploy such a director and to make and carry out contracts.2 The con-
31955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 279, 125 N.E.2d at 238. 
43 Williston, Contracts §648 et seq., especially §§652, 653, 661 (rev. ed. 1936). 
5 Id. §653. 
§4.6. ! 332 Mass. 92, 123 N.E.2d 386 (1954). 
2 G.L., c. 122, §§26N, 26P. 
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tract with the plaintiff was made by the chairman of the board with the 
approval of all its members. . 
However, before the employment of plaintiff the defendant authority 
"had agreed with the Commonwealth" not to enter any contracts with-
out prior approval of the State Housing Board. After the contract 
was made the State Housing Board specifically disapproved it. The 
defendant authority then discharged the plaintiff. He sought a de-
claratory decree to be reinstated. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial court's finding for 
the defendant and ordered a decree be entered declaring the contract 
valid and still in force. It found that the plaintiff, being unaware 
of the "agreement" between the defendant and the Commonwealth, 
could hold the defendants to the contract on the apparent authority of 
the chairman. The statutory grants of authority to the local housing 
authority could certainly also be relied on by the plaintiff in such cir-
cumstances. 
§4.7. Broker's commission: Revocation of authority. The decision 
in Dragone v. Dell'Isola l is addressed to the always troublesome ques-
tion of a broker's commission. The defendant requested the plaintiff, 
a real estate broker, to procure a customer to buy the defendant's land 
for $8500. The broker saw one Grande, or a representative of his cor-
poration, who stated the price was too high. Thereafter one D'Angelo, 
not knowing of the dealings of the plaintiff with Grande, saw the de-
fendant and was told he would sell for $8000. D' Angelo told Grande 
who agreed to buy the property. The defendant then told the plain· 
tiff of the sale, including Grande's name. The plaintiff asserted 
Grande was his customer. The defendant thus learned this for the first 
time. He proceeded to sell to Grande. The trial judge found the 
plaintiff's efforts were the active and efficient cause of the agreement 
of sale; that the failure of the plaintiff to disclose the identity of his 
customer was not material; and that the defendant proceeded with the 
sale in bad faith. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held the subsidiary findings did not 
support the conclusions of the trial judge. There was no employment 
and the defendant could withdraw any offer before he had notice of a 
customer procured by the plaintiff. There was no bad faith because 
the defendant learned of the plaintiff's negotiations with Grande only 
when he called to revoke the plaintiff's authority.2 
In its opinion, the Court stressed the fact that the broker had not 
produced a customer ready, willing, and able to pay the agreed price, 
$8500, before the plaintiff's revocation.s In addition, the broker never 
introduced the defendant to Grande and did nothing further after 
Grande told him the price was too high. The necessary import of the 
§4.7. 1332 Mass. 11, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 877, 122 N.E.2d 892. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 878, 122 N.E.2d at 894. 
S Ibid. 
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Court's decision is that the plaintiff was not the active and efficient 
cause of the sale under all the circumstances of the case. 
In another interesting broker's commission case, Livingston v. 
George McArthur & Sons, Inc.,4 the Court reiterated the principle that 
an offer to the broker may be revoked until the contract comes into ex-
istence, i.e., until the broker has turned the customer over to his em-
ployer, all in the absence of bad faith on the part of the employer. 
The broker cannot recover for time or expense, even if the employer 
avails himself to some extent of the fruits of the broker's labor and the 
revocation occurs in the midst of negotiations with a possible or proba-
ble customer. Up to the time the defendant notified the plaintiff that 
all sales included in his territory were being handled by someone else, 
he had only talked and negotiated. A letter was held a sufficient revo-
cation of the authority of the plaintiff. 
4332 Mass. 92, 123 N.E.2d 386 (1954). 
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